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Profits in Subrogation: An Insurer's Claim to Be 
More than Indemnified 
"[Ilf the assured is not entitled to retain an excess against 
the insurer, and the insurer . . . is not entitled to receive the 
excess from the assured, what happens to the excess?"l This ques- 
tion, posed by Lord Justice Megaw in L. Lucas Ltd. v. Export 
Credits Guarantee Depa~trnent,~ is bred by the juxtaposition of 
two subrogation rules. The right to subrogation, being in nature 
like restitution, entitles the holder of the right only to reimburse- 
ment3 and, under a contract of insurance, "the assured . . . shall 
be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than fully indemni- 
fied. "' The confusion that distribution of windfall profits in sub- 
rogation has brought to American and English courts derives 
from both the difficulty of the question and its rarity. Because 
insurance agreements are contracts of indemnity, the issue of 
which party is entitled to any possible excess once both insurer 
and insured have been indemnified has seldom been litigated. 
This Comment will evaluate a subrogee's right to recover 
more than it paid to the subrogor. The purpose of subrogation and 
insurance will be outlined, focusing on those few recent cases in 
England and the United States dealing with the profit-in- 
subrogation issue. Next, this Comment will examine the circum- 
stances under which a windfall might accrue to the insurer and 
the possible justifications and consequences of such a windfall 
award. A flexible approach for courts confronted with allocating 
a windfall in an equitable subrogation suit will then be proposed. 
Finally, the implications of choosing a flexible approach to wind- 
falls in subrogation will be contrasted with the view that the 
windfall be awarded strictly to either the insured or the insurer. 
11. PRINCIPLES OF SUB ROGATION^ 
A. Subrogation as Restitution 
When the condition upon which an insurance contract is 
1. L. Lucas Ltd. v. Export Credits Guar. Dep't, [I9731 2 All E.R. 984,990-91 (C.A.), 
reu'd on other grounds, [I9741 2 All E.R. 889 (H.L.). 
2. Id. 
3. See Memphis & L.R.R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 302 (1887). 
4. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 386 (1883). 
5. Subrogation has been defined as 
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based occurs6 and the insured is indemnified by the insurer for 
his loss, the insured would retain a right of action against the 
tortfeasor7 for his damages absent equitable subrogation. In this 
situation two possibilities emerge,8 both of which are undesirable: 
(1) the insured brings an action against the tortfeasor, thereby 
recovering twice for the loss,@ or (2) the insured, having been 
compensated by the insurer, does not bring an action against the 
tortfeasor, thereby freeing the tortfeasor from responsibility for 
his wrongful acts. By vesting the cause of action against the 
wrongdoer in the insurer who paid for the loss, theoretically both 
these undesirable results can be avoided, with neither the insured 
nor the insurer recovering more than an indemnity a t  the expense 
of the other.1° Thus subrogation is a restitutionary measure, the 
a right equitable in origin and enforceable in common law, whereby a nonvolun- 
teer who has made payment to another party by reason of a debt for which he 
is only secondarily responsible, takes over that party's rights and remedies 
against the third party (ies) who is (are) primarily responsible for such debt. 
R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN I SURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 13-14 (1964). The term subroga- 
tion as used in this Comment will refer, except where otherwise noted, to legal or equitable 
subrogation created by law as opposed to conventional subrogation created by contract. 
While there generally is little distinction between legal and conventional subrogation, this 
Comment deals with when profit may equitably accrue to a subrogee, and not when profit 
must accrue through enforcement of a contractual right. See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF 
INSURANCE LAW fj 61:2 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966); Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of 
Subrogation Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1973 INS. L.J. 573. For a concise analysis of 
subrogation theory, see King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEX. L. 
REV. 62 (1951). 
6. An insurer's liability under a contract of insurance may be triggered by a variety 
of circumstances, including the commission of a tort, a breach of contract, or bankruptcy. 
7. For simplification, "tortfeasor" will be used throughout this Comment to refer 
generally to the party liable to the insured. 
8. See 16 G .  COUCH, supra note 5, 8 61:18; Kimball & Davis, The Extension of 
Insurance Subrogation, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 841, 841-42 (1962). 
9. See also 5 J. JOYCE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE 8 3537 (2d ed. 1918); W. VANCE, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 423 (1904): "If [the insured] were allowed to recover 
the amount of his loss from the tortfeasor and also from the insurance company, his 
misfortune would result in profit, rather than loss, and undoubtedly tend to greatly in- 
crease the number of such misfortunes." 
10. See Memphis & L.R.R.R. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1887) (emphasis in 
original) : 
The right of subrogation is not founded on contract. It is a creature of 
equity; is enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of substan- 
tial justice; and is independent of any contractual relations between the parties. 
All that the appellees can, in good conscience, d e m a a j s  r e i m b u ~ m e n t f g -  
their outlay . . . . When relief to that extent is accorded, they will have no just 
ground to complain . . . . 
In Memphis the Court limited the subrogee to six percent interest established by statute 
as the rate when no rate was agreed upon; the subrogee had claimed it was entitled to 
eight percent, which was the rate established by the contract between the subrogor and 
the creditor. 
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purpose for its creation being to prevent the unjust enrichment 
of either the insured" or the tortfeasor.12 
B. The Roblem of Windfalls 
Because subrogation law was founded on the insurance prin- 
ciples of indemnification,13 very few cases arise in which there is 
a possibility of a profit. The cases that do address the issue of 
whether an insurer can recover more than it paid on the subro- 
gated claim generally fall into two categories: (1) cases in which 
the insured is not fully compensated for his losses and the insurer, 
nonetheless, sues the tortfeasor for the full amount of the in- 
sured's injury; and (2) cases in which the insured is fully compen- 
sated and the insurer recovers from the tortfeasor more than the 
amount of the insured's injury. 
1. Case of the first type: partial indemnification 
Although the insured is not fully compensated where the 
amount of the insurance policy is less than the value of the claim 
insured, the insurer may claim that subrogation entitles him to 
all of the remedies of the insured, including the right to recover 
for the full amount of the injuries sustained. An example of this 
11. See Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 386 (1883): 
[Tlhis contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against which the 
policy has been made, shall be fully indemnified, but shall never be more than 
fully indemnified. That is the fundamental principle of insurance, and if ever a 
proposition is brought forward which is at variance with it, that is to say, which 
either will prevent the assured from obtaining a full indemnity, or which will 
give the assured more than a full indemnity, that proposition must certainly be 
wrong. 
12. See American Sur. Co. v. Bethlehem Nat'l Bank, 33 F. Supp. 722,723 (E.D. Pa.), 
rev'd, 116 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1940), rev'd, 314 U.S. 314 (1941). Accord, Stafford Metal Works, 
Inc. v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 418 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("the wrongdoer 
(tortfeasor) is not entitled to a windfall release from his obligation simply because the 
injured party had the foresight to obtain insurance"); R. HORN, supra note 5, at 24 ("the 
general purpose of subrogation is to facilitate placement of the financial consequences of 
loss on the party primarily responsible in law for such loss"). 
13. See, e.g., Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 
281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1940): "It follows that where the indemnity 
feature is not present in the insurance contract . . . the subrogation feature has no appli- 
cation"; 5 J.  JOYCE, supra note 9, g 3537, at 5880: "We have already seen that . . . 
insurance is a contract of indemnity, and it is for the purpose of carrying out this principle 
that the doctrine of subrogation has been adopted"; Kimball & Davis, supra note 8, a t  
849: "[S]ubrogation is justified by the indemnity character of the insurance contract, and 
denial of subrogation must rest on the fact that the contract of insurance in question is 
not gn indemnity contract." 
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situation is the case of The Livingstone.14 The insurer of a ship 
which sunk in a collision with the Livingstone paid $25,000 on a 
valued policy to the owners. The sunken ship was actually worth 
$37,500, and this amount was recovered from the tortfeasor. After 
the insurance company was paid $25,000, both the insurer and 
the owners claimed the remaining $12,500. It was the insurer's 
position that it was subrogated to all the rights of the owners, 
while the owners insisted they were to be indemnified for their 
uninsured loss. The Second Circuit, in awarding the $12,500 to 
the insured, said that subrogation 
does not permit one party to secure an unfair advantage over the 
other; it does not permit the insurer to speculate, or profit or 
drive an unconscionable bargain. When he is paid in full equity 
requires the return of the balance to the insured in payment of 
his uncompensated loss. 
. . . .  
. . . [Elquity and good conscience do not require the court 
to go further and permit [the insurer] to realize an enormous 
profit from the transaction.15 
This remedy clearly satisfies the principle of indemnification. 
Proft to the insurance company could only have come at the 
direct expense of the owners.16 
2. Cases of the second type: full indemnification 
In the second type of case, both the insured and insurer have 
been indemnified and there is the possibility of recovering addi- 
tional funds. With the exception of cases where interest on the 
award makes the amount recovered more than the actual loss," 
14. 130 F. 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904). Cf. D'Angelo v. Cornell 
Paperboard Prods. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 390, 120 N.W.2d 70 (1963) (insurer paid insured 
$120,000 in workmen's compensation, then attempted to recover $300,000 through subro- 
gation). 
15. 130 F. at 749, 751. 
16. While cases of the first type emphasize that the insurer will not be able to recover 
a profit if it deprives the insured of an indemnity, the convene is also true: 
The general rule of law (and it is obvious justice) is that where there is a 
contract of indemnity . . . and a loss happens, anything which reduces or di- 
minishes that loss reduces or diminishes the amount which the indemnifier is 
bound to pay; and if the indemnifier has already paid it, then, if anything which 
diminishes the loss comes into the hands of the person towhom he lias paid it, 
it becomes an equity that the person who has already paid the full indemnity is 
entitled to be recouped by having that amount back. 
Burnand v. Rodocanachi Sons & Co., 7 App. Cas. 333,339 (1882), cited with approval in 
Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R.R. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S. 79, 88 (1891). 
17. Although the addition of interest to the subrogee's award may make the award 
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this situation is rare-so rare, in fact, that the issue was not 
presented for judicial review until within the last few years.18 
a. English decisions. lg The most prominent case, English or 
American, considering the issues involved in denying or awarding 
a windfall to an indemnified insurer is Yorkshire Insurance Co. 
v. Nisbet Shipping Co.'O Yorkshire paid Nisbet for the loss of its 
ship in a 1945 accident with a Canadian vessel. Yorkshire paid 
Nisbet f72,000 under the policy, but the actual value of the ship 
was around e75'514. In 1958 when the Canadian Government, the 
tortfeasor, finally paid the value of Nisbet's ship in dollars, the 
pound had been devalued and the dollars were worth f126,971. 
Both Yorkshire and Nisbet claimed the f 55,000 difference. Jus- 
- 
greater than the amount paid to the subrogor, many courts do not view the interest as an 
extra award by way of damages, but rather as compensation for the use of money. See 
Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177, 185 (1872): "Interest is the compensation allowed 
by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forebearance of money, or as damages for its 
detention . . . ." 
Interest in some situations, however, may also be profit. In Glenn v. American Sur. 
Co., 160 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1947) the court awarded interest to the surety on a contractor's 
bond. The surety sought and was awarded interest on the amount paid on the bond. The 
dissent stated: "While interest is not generally the equivalent of profit, it may become so 
. . . . There are relatively few six percent investments in the portfolios of insurance 
companies." Id. at 983. 
18. There are many statements in reported opinions which would purportedly cover 
the situation where both the insured and insurer have been indemnified and an excess 
remains to be distributed. Typical of these is the dicta in The St. Johns, 101 F. 469,474- 
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1900): 
If the amount recoverable from the wrongdoer, after payment of the 
damage-claims of third parties, were in excess of the amount paid by the under- 
writers to the assured, no doubt that excess would belong to the latter; since the 
insurer's right of subrogation in equity could not extend beyond recoupment or 
indemnity for the actual payments to the assured. 
The statement clearly applies to cases where the insurer seeks to make a profit when the 
insured has not been fully indemnified. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. The law 
simply has not had to confront directly the problem of distributing a profit between 
subrogee and subrogor because, owing to the indemnifying nature of insurance, there has 
not been a profit to distribute. An annotated statement similar to the dicta in The St. 
Johns is made at 41 L.R.A. (n.8.) 720 note (1913), but not one of the cases cited deals with 
a bona fide windfall. Similarly, no cases are cited in support of RESTATEMENT OF 
RESTITUTION Q 162, Comment i (1937): "[The surety] is entitled to be made whole, but 
he is not entitled to make a profit." See also R. KEETON, BASIC Twc~ ON INSURANCE LAW 
160-62 (1971). 
19. English maritime insurance cases are accorded respect in American courts to 
preserve uniformity in interpretation and enforcement. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
340 U.S. 54, 59 (1950); Aetna Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304 U.S. 430, 438 (1938). 
20. 119621 2 Q.B. 330. The court noted that this suit was the first recorded case 
where the "quantum of the insurer's right of subrogation" has been questioned after 
payment on a total loss (indemnification). Id. at 342. For a discussion of Yorkshire and 
its implications for subrogation in England, see Hodgin, Subrogation in Insurance h w ,  
1975 J .  Bus. L. 114. 
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tice Diplock carefully reviewed the major English subrogation 
decisions as well as the decision in The LiuingstoneZ1 and con- 
cluded that the insurance company was entitled only to the 
amount it had paid the insured, f72,000. The court stated that 
the rule it adopted "renders irrelevant any consideration of the 
particular concatenation of circumstances which enable the as- 
sured to recover from the Canadian Government a sum in sterling 
in excess of the value of the ship at the time of the cas~al ty ."~  
A later case commenting on Yorkshire, L. Lucas Ltd. v. Ex- 
port Credits," found that all pounds must be treated the same, 
without regard for the exchange rate or the purchasing power of 
the pounds.24 According to this interpretation, the rule in 
Yorkshire means that the subrogee may recover exactly what he 
paid and nothing more-perhaps not even interest. Yorkshire 
therefore seems to be inconsistent with the significant number of 
other English cases in which interest has been awarded to the 
subrogee .% 
Yorkshire can perhaps also be criticized on another, more 
fundamental ground. While a certain uneasiness about insurance 
companies recovering a greater amount than they paid to the 
insured can be appreciated, Yorkshire is one case in which pay- 
ment of an excess to the insurer would have been justified by 
principles basic to subrogation. By deciding that the insurance 
company was entitled to only what it had paid, the court allowed 
21. 130 F. 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904). Yorkshire only cited The 
Livingstone in a footnote, but the passage tiom The St. Johns, note 18 supra, was quoted 
in the text. [I9621 2 Q.B. a t  345-46. 
22. [I9621 2 Q.B. a t  346. 
23. [I9731 2 All E.R. 984 (C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, [I9741 2 All E.R. 889 
(H.L.) (unanimous Court of Appeals reversed by unanimous decision of House of Lords 
on the interpretation of a statutory subrogation clause). 
24. The court said: 
[A] pound is always a pound: so that whatever the exchange rates between the 
pound and any or all other currencies, and whatever may happen between one 
date and another to the internal purchasing power of the pound, in the eye of 
the law a pound today is the same as it was yesterday or a year ago or ten years 
ago . . . . If it were otherwise, I could see strong ground for the argument that 
the guarantors were not fully indemnified by receiving in 1968 the same number 
of pounds as they had paid out in 1966. But as the law stands they must be 
regarded as having been fully indemnified. 
[I9731 2 All E.R. a t  989 (citing In Re United Rys. of the Havana & ReghWarehouses, 
Ltd., [I9601 2 All E.R. 332, 356 (H.L.)). 
25. H. Cousins & Co. v. D. & C. Carriers Ltd., [I9711 2 W.L.R. 85 (C.A.); In re 
Miller, Gibb & Co., [I9571 1 W.L.R. 703 (Ch.); Parsons v. Briddock, 23 Eng. Rep. 997 
(Ch. 1708). In Swain v. Wall, 21 Eng. Rep. 534, 535.(Ch. 1641), the court awarded 5100 
to indemnify the surety and further awarded him 47 10s for "nine Months Damages." 
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Nisbet Shipping to benefit from both the insurance and the tort- 
feasor's payment. Nisbet Shipping was paid f72,OOO in 1945 for 
their ship. It had the use of those funds until 1958 when it col- 
lected an additional f55,000. The j55,000 is an excessive recov- 
ery-in contravention of one of the restitutionary purposes for 
which subrogation was created-especially because the later 
award did not reflect the interest that could have been earned on 
the f 72,OOO paid in 1945.26 In contrast, Yorkshire Insurance paid 
f 7 2 , h  in 1945 and recovered f 72,OOO in 1958; Yorkshire was not 
even awarded interesten Nisbet Shipping was unjustly enriched 
a t  the expense bf Yorkshire I n s ~ r a n c e . ~ ~  
b. US.  cases. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wilhoitz9 
is a well-reasoned opinion in which a Kentucky court applied 
basic subrogation principles in making an award of interest to an 
insurer. The FDIC, as the insurer of an insolvent bank, reim- 
bursed the depositors of the bank for their losses. The issue con- 
fronted by the court was whether the FDIC was entitled to inter- 
est on the amount paid the depositors of a commercial bank 
several years before the resolution of the suit. The court held that 
it  was.30 Had the court taken direction from The Livingstone or 
Yorkshire and denied any award of interest, one of the basic 
principles of subrogation would have been ~iolated.~'  On the one 
hand, if the court had awarded the interest to the depositors 
themselves, they would have received a double recovery of inter- 
26. See text accompanying note 9 supra. 
27. Interest is commonly awarded in subrogation cases in England. See note 25 supra. 
28. The only solution which would have indemnified Yorbhire Insurance without 
giving Nisbet Shipping a windfall profit would have been for the Canadian Government 
to pay the equivalent of f72,000. But this solution would have relieved the Canadian 
Government from full responsibility for the shipping accident. It would thus violate the 
subrogation policy of holding the responsible party liable. See note 12 and accompanying 
text supra. 
29. 297 Ky. 339, 180 S.W.2d 72 (1943). 
30. The court stated: 
It is true that the equitable doctrine of subrogation is enforced solely for the 
purpose of accomplishing the ends of substantial justice and that there is no 
inexorable rule by which the right is to be measured. So a court of equity may 
cut down or lessen rights of the subrogee, as by denying interest, or may even 
bar subrogation altogether. However, generally the subrogee is placed in the 
shoes or in the precise position of one to whose rights he is subrogated and is 
entitled to all legal rights and remedies available to the creditor. 
Id. at 348, 180 S.W.2d at 76. 
Interest has commonly been awarded in Kentucky subrogation cases. E.g., Glenn v. 
American Sur. Co., 160 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1947); Evan's Adm'r v. Evans, 304 Ky. 28,199 
S.W.2d 734 (1947); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487,192 S.W.2d 388 (1946). 
31. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra. 
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est on their deposits because they had previously been indemni- 
fied by the FDIC with money that could have been invested or 
deposited and drawing interest itself. On the other hand, if the 
court had refused to award interest to either the depositors or the 
FDIC, the result would have been tantamount to awarding the 
interest to the insolvent bank because the bank would have had 
the interest-free use of the FDIC's money.32 
The issue of windfall or profit, other than interest, has been 
raised in at  least two decisions in the United States? The first is 
Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. u. Local 612, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters." Carolina Casualty; having paid an 
insurance claim on vehicles damaged in a union-management 
dispute, sued the union for compensatory and punitive damages. 
The court first noted that it was unable to find a case directly on 
points and then dismissed the claim for punitive damages, citing 
Corpus Juris Secundum for the general rule that subrogation 
gives indemnity only.36 The "indemnity only" rule is derived from 
cases like The Livingstones7 where the insurer only partially in- 
demnified the insured; nevertheless, the court in Carolina 
Casualty refused the claim without any discussion of the rule, its 
origin, or its rationale. 
In contrast to Carolina Casualty is the novel decision in 
Urban Industries, Inc. v. Thevis? The court in that case held 
that an insurance company subrogee may recover more than the 
amount which it paid its subrogor. The defendant, Thevis, had 
32. See also H. Cousins & Co. v. D. & C. Carriers Ltd., [I9711 2 W.L.R. 85 (C.A.). 
33. Similar issues were raised in Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. 
Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976), and Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 
1971). In Commercial Union the court dismissed a claim for punitive damages since 
punitive damages are not recoverable in Louisiana. 409 F. Supp. at 68-59. 
In Brown, the court cited GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1805 (1970) which states: "A right of 
action is assignable if it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property; but a right of 
action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be 
assigned." The court then cited Louisville & N.R.R. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So. 306 
(1909) to the effect that the right to punitive damages is not property. Also relied upon 
for the rule that a subrogee is entitled to indemnity only were 83 C.J.S. Subrogation 6 
14, at 614 (1953) and 50 AM. JUR. Subrogaton 8 119, a t  760 (1944). 
Punitive damages were actually awarded to an insurance company where it was 
understood that the funds would go to the insured's widow. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. 
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 250 Ala. 354, 34 So. 2d 474 (1948). 
34. 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956). --- - - - - - 
35. "[Rlesearch has failed to reveal a case directly holding that an insurer or a surety 
suing alone as a subrogee may recover punitive damages against a wrongdoer." Id. a t  943. 
36. Id. 
37. 130 F .  746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 637 (1904). 
38. No. C 75-0342 L(A) (W.D. Ky. July 13, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3615 (6th 
Cir. Nov. 7, 1978). 
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hired two felons to burn the building of his competitor, Urban 
Industries. Urban was indemnified for its property losses by four 
insurance companies. Urban and the insurance companies 
brought suit against Thevis; Urban suing for lost profits (for 
which it had not been indemnified), the insurers suing on their 
subrogation rights for the property losses. The jury awarded each 
of the plaintiffs the compensatory damages claimed plus punitive 
damages .3B 
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in 
the alternative, a new trial, the court ruled in favor of Urban 
Industries and the insurance companies. The court relied on 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Wilhoit40 and refused the 
Carolina Casualty rule.41 According to the court, the opinion in 
Wilhoit, which permitted an extra award (interest) to be paid the 
subrogee, demonstrated that "Kentucky has no policy against the 
recovery of damages over and above compensatory damages by a 
subrogee ."42 
The Urban Industries decision is unique in several waysed3 
First, a major windfall was awarded to the in~urers~~-a result 
examined and rejected by Carolina Casualty and Yorkshire. Sec- 
ond, the windfall was not awarded exclusively to the insurers; 
both the insurers and the insured received excess funds-a possi- 
bility not even considered in Yorkshire. The remainder of this 
Comment will examine the ground upon which the Urban 
Industries decision might be based and the policy considerations 
to be scrutinized before a rule favoring either the Urban 
Industries or Yorkshire approach is adopted. 
39. Each of the insurance companies was awarded 10 times its compensatory dam- 
ages in punitive damages; Urban Industries was awarded slightly more than 57 times its 
compensatory damages in punitive damages. Id. slip op. at 1. 
40. 297 Ky. 339, 180 S.W.2d 72 (1943). 
41. The court in Urban Industries did not cite Carolina Casualty, but it cited Mary- 
land Cas. Co. v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a decision based in part on 
Carolina Casualty. See note 33 supra. 
42. Urban Indus. Inc. v. Thevis, No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip op. a t  6. 
43. The court noted that the questions presented were "interesting and novel" and 
that "[tlhe case a t  bar, insofar as it pertains to punitive damages, is and will probably 
continue to be unique, for this Court knows of no instance where an insurance company 
has been awarded punitive damages ad where its insured also has been awarded such 
damages." Id. slip op. at 1, 6. 
44. The total judgment against Thevis exceeded $675,000, $450,000 of which went to 
the four insurance companies. Thevis, hardly judgment-proof, is the president of Global 
Industries, which operates an "empire" of X-rated theaters and "adult" bookstores. His 
empire has been valued at $100 million. See Cook, The X-Rated Economy, FORBES, Sept. 
18, 1978, at 81. NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1978, a t  30; TIME, May 29, 1978, at 25. 
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A. Subrogation as Cession of Property 
At Roman law subrogation meant the literal substitution of 
one party for another.45 At common law when the insurer paid the 
debt of the insured, the insured ceded his rights in the action to 
the insurer. The insurer or subrogee was therefore entitled to 
precisely the same rights, claims, and defenses of the insured.46 
The idea of cession was evident in the Urban Industries decision; 
the court noted that an insurance company "becomes subrogated 
to any claim for the same damages which the insured might have 
recovered. ''47 
45. In Roman law subrogation meant that one official's actions replaced another's 
actions. The doctrine was called cessio actionum. The transference of rights required a 
positive action and could be lost through inaction. In contrast, in English law the cession 
of property was a right automatically conferred by law when the insurer or surety paid 
the debt of the insured. Marasinghe, An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subro- 
gation: The Early History of the Doctrine I, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 45, 45-46, 50 (1976). 
Subrogation, as cession of property, is similar to assignment, although the two have 
been distinguished on the grounds that assignment is merely a contractual transfer of 
rights. See 6A J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4053 (1972) 
(subrogation is substitution for a party; assignment is a transfer of rights); 16 G. COUCH, 
supra note 5, 8 61:92 (subrogation is an act of the law; assignment is a voluntary act of 
the parties). 
This distinction between subrogation and assignment may favor the argument that 
even though a claim for punitive damages generally may not be assigned, see, e.g., People 
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283,507 P.2d 1400,107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); Dugar v. Happy 
Tiger Records, Inc., 41 Cal. App. 3d 812, 116 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1974); French v. Orange 
County Inv. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 587, 13 P.2d 1046 (1932); contra, Dunshee v. Standard 
Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 146 N.W. 830 (1914), allowing a subrogee to recover punitive 
damages may be justified since the right of subrogation is generally preferred to a claim 
by assignment, see, e.g., Hardaway v. National Sur. Co., 211 U.S. 552, 561 (1908); Prairie 
State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227, 232 (1896). 
46. The classic statement on English subrogaton law is Castellain v. P~keston, 11 
Q.B.D. 380 (1883). The court said: 
[A]s between the underwriter and the assured the underwriter is entitled to the 
advantage of every right of the assured, whether such right consists in contract, 
fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of being insisted or already 
insisted on, or in any other right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal 
or equitable . . . . 
Id. a t  388. 
47. No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip op. at 4. The court based this conclusion on a statement 
in Bratton v. Speaks, 286 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Ky. 1956): "[The insurer] becomes subro- 
gated to any claim for the same damages which the insured might have recovered from 
the wrongdoer causing the damages." -- .- - 
The right of an insurance company to collect literally anything the insured could have 
recovered was upheld in North of Eng. Iron S.S. Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, L.R. 5 Q.B. 244 
(1870). In Armstrong the policy stated that the value of the insured ship was $6000. When 
the ship sunk the owner was paid the f6000 from the tortfeasor, but subsequently the 
owner recovered f9000 from the tortfeasor, the actual value of the ship. The court stated: 
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The notion of subrogation as substitution of one party for 
another has had greater significance in the United States than in 
England; this may explain why the Kentucky court in Urban 
Industries was willing to allow an excess recovery while the Eng- 
lish court in Yorkshire was not. In England, the subrogee must 
maintain his action against the wrongdoer in the name of the 
s~brogor ;~~  in the United States, the majority rule is that the 
subrogee must sue in his own name in deference to real-party-in- 
interest rules .'"n Urban Industries, the. insurance companies 
were by action of law the real parties in interest and seemed 
entitled, conceptually at  least, to the windfall fruits of the 
suit-punitive damages. 
[Ilf a party chooses to have his vessel or his goods . . . taken a t  a fixed value, 
instead of leaving the contract, as in an ordinary policy, simply one of indemnity 
to the extent of the real value, and if thereby any benefit accrues to the under- 
writers, the underwriters must be entitlted to it. 
Id. at 250. Armstrong was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in The Potomac, 
105 US.  630, 635 (1881), but was repudiated in Aetna Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304 
US. 430 (1938): "[Ilt would in some cases deprive the insured of indemnity, and indeed 
might enable the insurer to make a profit by recovering more from the insured than the 
amounts paid on the policy. We are unable to sanction a doctrine involving such conse- 
quences." Id. a t  436. 
Various attempts have been made to distinguish Armstrong. In Thames & Mersey 
Marine Ins. Co. v. British & Chilian S.S. Co., [I9151 2 K.B. 214, aff'd, [I9161 1 K.B. 
30 (C.A.), the court commented on Armstrong but dismissed the passage as dicta. The 
court in Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [I9621 2 Q.B. 330, cited Glen Line, 
Ltd. v. Attorney-General, 46 T.L.R. 451 (H.L. 1930), to show that Armstrong had not 
properly distinguished between subrogation and abandonment. Yorkshire held that, in 
any case, Armstrong was in conflict with Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883), the 
"locus classicus of subrogation in insurance." [I9621 2 Q.B. a t  343. See 10 J. ATWOULD, 
BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS: THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE 1[ 1219 (1961). 
In subrogation the subrogee is entitled to the rights and remedies of the subrogor while 
in abandonment the subrogee is entitled to the actual property insured. 10 J. ARNOULD, 
Supra 1216; R. GOFF & G .  JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 388 (1966); 25 HALSBURY'S 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 1[ 332 (4th ed. 1978). 
48. simpson & Co. v. Thomson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877). 
49. It was felt the insured would become indifferent once the claim was paid, so the 
insurer was allowed to sue in his own name. L. DONAHUE, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF ~ S U R A N C E  
65 (1927). In Kentucky the subrogee must bring the action in his own name as the real 
party in interest. KY. R. CT. 17.01. See Monson v. Payne, 199 Ky. 105,250 S.W. 798 (1923); 
Bryan v. Henderson Elec. Co., 566 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
A similar rule is used in the federal courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See also United 
States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (subrogated insurer is real party in 
interest); National Garment v. New York C. & St. L.R.R., 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949) 
(insurer partially subrogated may sue in own name). Cf. United States Merchants' & 
Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line, 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933) 
(citizenship of subrogee used in determining diversity jurisdiction). 
156 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
B. The Insurer's Interest 
One of the justifications given for the punitive award to the 
insurers in Urban Industries was the expense incurred by the 
insurance companies in investigating and pursuing their claim.50 
If the insurance companies had sought and been awarded recov- 
ery for their own expenses directly, the suit would have been, in 
form, an action in tort. That is, the insurers would have been 
recovering under an independent, nonderivative right to sue the 
tortfeasor. Although it has been weakly suggested that an insurer 
may obtain to some independent rights by virtue of a property 
interest in the insured r e ~ , ~ l  the possibility of other nonderivative 
insurers' rights has never been confronted. This is probably be- 
cause resort to such a rationale is not necessary or prudent. In 
most cases, the right of subrogation is sufficient to protect the 
interests of the insurers, although good cause might be shown in 
rare cases for awarding insurance companies the costs of investi- 
gating and processing a claim. An award of interest or attorneys' 
fees might be even more appropriate. 
C. Equitable Su brogation Principles 
The value of Urban Industries lies not so much in the justifi- 
cation given by the court, but rather in the result and in the 
rationale that could have been given. The jury's award of com- 
pensatory and punitive damages to the subrogees in the case had 
a certain intrinsic appeal, and it did not offend the basic objec- 
tives of subrogation law-it indemnified both the insured and the 
insurers and held the tortfeasor responsible. But, before the rule 
can become valid law, there must be a legal justification. Because 
subrogation is an equitable notion, the flexibility inherent in eq- 
50. No. C 75-0342 L(A), slip. op. at 5. 
51. In London Assurance Co. v. Sainsbury, 99 Eng. Rep. 636,640 (K.B. 1783), Justice 
Willes stated: 
I admit that a man cannot transfer his right to a chose in action; but if the 
insurer had an original right, he may elect to sue in his own name or in that of 
the insured. . . . This is not like a wager; it is an insurance on the house, and 
gives an interest in it. 
The idea that the insurer took a cestui's interest in the property insured was never 
adopted; it was repudiated in Simpson v. Thomson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877), because under 
that rule almost anyone having a relationship with the insuer d could clacm some injury. 
The resulting suits against the tortfeasor "might be both numerous and novel." Id. a t  290. 
It could also be hypothesized that if the insured negligently damaged his property, the 
insurer, by virtue of his cestui's interest, would have a defense against the insured, thus 
canceling the insurance policy. 
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uitable actions justifies the desirable result reached.52 
The equitable notion of subrogation embraces a concept con- 
sistent with the purpose for punitive damages-holding the tort- 
feasor responsible for his actions. Inherent in an award of punitive 
damages is the idea of civil punishment. If punitive damages are 
a deterrent and a punishment," from society's point of view the 
identity of the party collecting the award is ~nimpor tant .~~ If the 
court in Urban Industries can be criticized for administering sub- 
rogation by principles of "natural justice,". the alternative of not 
permitting the punitive damages might have unjustly enriched 
the tortfeasor . 
IV. REPERCUSSIONS OF A FLEXIBLE APPROACH 
Opting for a flexible rather than a rigid rule regarding who 
can and who cannot recover any excesses in a subrogation case 
presents some questions which are worthy of consideration, espe- 
cially because in the wake of Urban Industries it is reasonable to 
52. The court stated in Flannary v. Utley, 3 S.W. 412, 413 (Ky. 1887): 
Subrogation is a creation of equity, born of the civil law. Its object is to secure 
essential justice, without regard to form. Being of purely equitable origin, it is 
always controlled by equitable principles; and, as between a principal and his 
sureties, has been applied much more extensively in the American than in 
English jurisprudence. We do not mean to say, however, that its application is 
controlled alone by the chancellor's conception of right. The doctrine cannot be 
applied . . . where it will work injustice to the rights of others. 
See also National Sur. Corp. v. Allen-Codell Co., 70 F. Supp. 189, 192 (E.D. Ky. 1947); 
Evans' Adm'r v. Evans, 304 Ky. 28, 32, 199 S.W.2d 734, 737 (1947); Western Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Meyer, 301 Ky. 487, 492-93, 192 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (1946). 
53. In early Kentucky decisions punitive damages were intended not only as punish- 
ment, but also as compensation for the plaintiff. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148 
Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roth, 130 Ky. 759, 114 S.W. 264 
(1908); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859). Gradually, the courts have come to 
view punitive damages more as punishment than compensation. Hensley v. Paul Miller 
Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974); Ashland' Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 
195 S.W.2d 312 (1946). 
Punitive damages need not bear a relationship to the compensatory award but must 
bear a relationship to the injury. Kidd v. Burlew, 407 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1969); Flame Coal 
Co. v. UMW, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962). In Kentucky 
recovery of compensatory damages is not necessarily a prerequisite to support a punitive 
damages claim. See Maddix v. Gammon, 293 Ky. 540, 169 S.W.2d 594 (1943); Louisville 
& N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912). 
54. See Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640, 646-48 (D. Del. 1970) (plaintiff indirectly 
injured awarded exemplary damages). Cf. Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283, 1285 
(Okla. 1976) (punitive damages awarded not to compensate victim, but to deter similar 
conduct). But see French v. Orange County Inv. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 587, 591, 13 P.2d 
1046, 1048 (1932) (punitive damages awarded only to party immediately injured); Hughey 
v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 154 S.E.2d 839 (1967) (remote victim of tort cannot recover 
punitive damages). 
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expect that insurance companies will demand rights to punitive 
damages and statutory penalties. 
A flexible approach can only be taken at  the cost of some 
certainty in the law, but this cost is small when compared to the 
alternative risks. If Yorkshire were the rule,55 then the insured 
would always recover any excess resulting from the suit, no mat- 
ter who brings it, and the insured might benefit without incurring 
the costs of litigati~n.~" the insured must recover all excesses 
and the potential extra award is in the form of punitive damages, 
the insurer might not be able to raise the issue in the pleadings 
unless the insured either joined the action or brought a separate 
suit. There would be additional complications in those states 
where the insured could not bring his own suit for punitive dam- 
ages because they cannot be awarded without an award of com- 
pensatory  damage^.^' In such situations the tortfeasor could es- 
cape civil responsibility for his action." On the other hand, if 
there were a fixed rule that all excesses belonged to the insurer, 
then the insured, who was directly injured, would be denied any 
benefit resulting from the award of punitive damages. This might 
encourage the insured to forego the insurance in hopes of getting 
55. While Yorkshire dealt with an excess resulting from changes in an exchange rate, 
Justice Diplock in Yorkshire clearly contemplated the possibility that an insurer would 
claim punitive damages. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [I9621 2 Q.B. 330, 
334. 
56. In Yorkshire the insurance company initially bore all of the costs of litigation 
against the Canadian Government, although the court said: 
By agreement between the parties I can ignore for the purposes of this judgment 
the costs incurred in the litigation between the assured and the Canadian Gov- 
ernment. They have agreed between themselves as to the way in which these 
will be dealt with, depending upon the ultimate decision in this action upon the 
question of principle involved. 
Id. at 338. Presumably, under less amicable circumstances the insurance company might 
be responsible for all of the litigation expenses even though the insured ultimately col- 
lected the windfall. 
57. See, e.g., Gomez v. Dykes, 89 Ariz. 171, 359 P.2d 760 (1961); Contractor's Safety 
Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 307 P.2d 626 (1957); Hilbert v. 
Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). In a t  least one jurisdicton the recovery of punitive 
damages alone may be barred by statute. Eckels v. Traverse, 362 P.2d 680, 683 (Okla. 
1961) (construing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, 4 9 (West 1951) to mean that actual damages 
must be recoverable before punitive damages may be awarded). 
58. This could be the ultimate result of the decision in Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Local 
612, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 136 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ala. 1956). See text accompanying 
notes 34-37 supra. If the insured in Carolina Casualty did nottxing a mbsequentzxtion 
for punitive damages, and the insurer was not permiited to collect punitive damages, the 
tortfeasor escaped without being punished for the malicious and deliberate nature of the 
tortious act. But even where the insured can bring a suit for punitive damages, there may 
be little incentive to join costly and time-consuming litigation in hopes of securing such 
damages. See DONAHUE, supm note 49. 
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both compensatory and punitive damages,5B which defeats the 
purpose for having the insurance. 
Unfortunately, little is known about what effect larger subro- 
gation recoveries might have on the behavior of insurance compa- 
nies." A recovery of extra damages might encourage insurers to 
speculate by insuring businesses with high tort risks, compensat- 
ing for the risk through the subrogation profits." With the move- 
ment toward insuring against punitive damages claims," allowing 
insurance companies to collect punitive damages might have lit- 
tle or no deterrent effect on the tortfeasor since the payment of 
punitive damages would constitute a transfer of funds between 
insurers. This would frustrate one of the purposes of subrogation 
by relieving the guilty party of the duty to pay for the egregious 
act. Finally, if insurers are permitted profit through a flexible 
subrogation rule, then the insurers should be forced to disgorge 
the benefits of the premiums either in the lawsuit settlement or 
through lower future rates." Since the potential for an increase 
59. See, e.g., Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N.Y. 273,146 N.E. 377 
(1925) (under then-existing law the insured was required to elect a remedy; he had to 
either collect workmen's compensation or sue the negligent party). 
60. Horn states that little information is available on the effect of subrogation on the 
insurance industry; thus subrogation's impact is speculative. R. HORN, supra note 5, a t  
146. 
61. Speculation was one of the evils which subrogation was meant to avoid. See 
Procaccia, supm note 5, at 575. 
62. See Levit, finitive Damages: Recent Developments, 1977 INS. L.J. 719. 
63. Unless some allowance were made, the insurer would have the benefits of the 
premiums and the subrogation award. It would seem proper in such a situation to force 
insurers to disgorge the benefits of past premiums. There is, however, no direct authority 
for such a proposition. The Arizona Supreme Court opined that lower premiums generally 
do not result from subrogation. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 118 Ariz. 301, 576 P.2d 489 
(1978). Patterson notes that "[s]ubrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part 
in rate schedules (or only a minor one), and no reduction is made in insuring interests 
. . . ." E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 151-52 (1957). At least one court has 
held that insurers need not disgorge the benefits of past premiums: 
It is objected that such a recovery by the surety constitutes a "windfall" in that 
in the event of such recovery the surety suffers no loss on its surety bond al- 
though it has been paid premiums by the insured to reimburse it against just 
such a loss, as here. This argument loses sight of two fundamental facts: first, 
that even if the surety recovers against the third party on subrogation it still 
has been put to the expense of paying agent's commissions . . . [,I investigat- 
ing the insured's claim and . . . settling or litigating it, and, second, that the 
amounts of recoveries by subrogation are taken into consideration in arriving at 
the amount of premiums to be charged for surety bonds. 
Standard Accident Ins. v. Pellechia, 15 N.J. 162, 188, 104 A.2d 288, 302 (1954). 
If subrogation has not been used in fixing rate schedules, it may be because recoveries 
under subrogaton clauses comprise a very small percentage of claims actually paid. For 
example, in 1972 insurance companies paid $973,636,000 in fire claims but recovered 
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in subrogation litigation is great, further consideration by the 
courts, the legislatures, and the insurance companies themselves 
would be useful. 
In adopting a rule on excess awards in subrogation, first con- 
sideration must be given to the insured. Although contrary hold- 
ings have been made, most courts have correctly sought to indem- 
nify the insured first. After indemnifying the insured, considera- 
tion should then be given to reimbursing the insurer. A policy 
which ignores these rules must be at variance with the purpose 
for either insurance or subrogation. Once both insured and in- 
surer have been indemnified, the court should be flexible in its 
award of any excess. Although in most cases the excess will natu- 
rally belong to the insured, the lesson to be learned from 
Yorkshire is that there are circumstances in which the insurer 
may deserve at least part of the excess. The Urban Industries 
decision stands for the proposition that as long as the insured is 
indemnified, the courts should be free to adjust the equities 
among the insured, insurer, and tortfeasor. On the basis of equi- 
table subrogation principles, there should be no absolute pro- 
scription of a windfall recovery by an insurer. 
Jay S. By bee 
through subrogation only $6,621,000 or .68% of the losses paid.-Meyers, Subrogation 
Rights and Recoveries Arising out of First Party Contracts, 9 FORUM 83, 84-85 (1973). 
